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Known-plaintext attack to two cryptosystems based
on the BB equation
G. Alvarez, L. Herna´ndez Encinas, and J. Mun˜oz Masque´
Abstract—Recently, Rama Murthy and Swamy proposed a
symmetric cryptosystem based on the Brahmagupta-Bha˜skara
(BB) equation. The BB equation is the quadratic Diophantine
equation equation nx2 + k = y2, where k is an integer and n is
a positive integer such that
√
n is irrational. For the particular
case k = 1, the equation is called the Pell equation. The proposed
cryptosystem was modified later by the same authors in order
to avoid the cryptanalysis given by Youssef. Below, a known-
plaintext attack to both cryptosystems is presented.
Index Terms—Brahmagupta-Bha˜skara equation, Cryptanaly-
sis, Cryptography, Pell equation.
I. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
THE Brahmagupta-Bha˜skara (BB) equation is thequadratic Diophantine equation
nx2 + k = y2,
where k is an integer and n is a positive integer such that√
n is irrational. For the particular case k = 1, the equation
is called the Pell equation.
The goal of this paper is to show that the two cryptosys-
tems proposed by Rama Murthy and Swamy in [2], [3] are
vulnerable to the known-plaintext attack and hence, they are
insecure.
First of all, we summarize the cryptosystem proposed in
[2], which was subsequently improved in [3] in order to avoid
the cryptanalysis appeared in [4]. The authors proposed a
symmetric cryptosystem based on the Pell equation in the finite
field GF (p), so that the Pell equation can be written as
nX + 1 ≡ Y (mod p), (1)
where p is a prime number, and X and Y are quadratic
residues modulo p. In the proposed symmetrical cryptosystem
there are two classes of keys: The primary key is a prime
number p, with t = blg pc the bitlength of p; the secondary key
is a couple of prime numbers, a and b in the interval (2t, p).
The plaintext corresponding to a block of the original message
of t bits, B, is the integer n defined as n = (B)10 + 1 < p,
where (B)10 is the decimal expression of the block B. The
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ciphertext, with bitlength 2(t + 1), corresponding to n is the
pair of integers, (s, d), given by
s ≡ aX + bY (mod p),
d ≡ aX − bY (mod p). (2)
The deciphering process to obtain n from (s, d) takes into
account the following expressions
X ≡ (2a)−1(s+ d) (mod p),
Y ≡ (2b)−1(s− d) (mod p),
n ≡ X−1(Y − 1) (mod p).
obtained from (2) and (1).
The authors claim the security of this cryptosystem is based
on the fact that there are infinitely many prime numbers greater
than 2t, and the keys are only limited by practical hard-
ware/software considerations. Nevertheless, Youssef presented
in [4] a known-plaintext attack to the previous cryptosystem by
using a system of four linear equations over Q. The equations
are deduced from the knowledge of two plaintexts, n1, n2,
and their corresponding ciphertexts, (s1, d1), (s2, d2), and the
four unknowns a−1, b−1, X1, and X2:
 s1 + d1 0 −2 0s2 + d2 0 0 −20 s1 − d1 2n1 0
0 s2 − d2 0 −2n2

 a
−1
b−1
X1
X2
 =
 002
2
 . (3)
Once the cryptanalyst has obtained the values a−1 = a11a12 ,
b−1 = b11b12 , X1, X2 ∈ Q, a similar system is solved by
using the equations derived from n1 or n2 and a new pair of
plaintext-ciphertext: (n3, (s3, d3)). Then new rational values
for a−1 = a21a22 and b
−1 = b21b22 are obtained, and from them
the value of
gcd (a11a22 − a12a21, b11b22 − b12b21) = p′
provides a multiple of the prime p.
In order to improve the previous cryptosystem, Rama
Murthy and Swamy proposed in [3] a modification in the
ciphering process. With the same notations as above, the
ciphertext (s, d), corresponding to a given plaintext n, is
computed as follows:
s = aX + bY (mod p)
d = bX − aY (mod p)
}
(4)
With such a modification, the attack proposed by Youssef is
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not effective as the linear system of equations (3) becomes −1 1 (a+ b)− n1(a− b) 0−1 1 0 (a+ b)− n2(a− b)1 1 (a− b) + n1(a+ b) 0
1 1 0 (a− b)− n2(a+ b)

 abX1
X2

=
 s1 + d1s2 + d2s1 − d1
s2 − d2
 ,
which cannot be solved in the unknowns a, b, X1, and X2,
when s1+d1, s2+d2, s1−d1,s2−d2, n1, and n2 are known.
II. CRYPTANALYSIS
In this section we present a cryptanalysis to the cryptosys-
tem introduced in [3] by using a known-plaintext attack. Sup-
pose that four distinct plaintext-ciphertext pairs (ni, (si, di)),
i = 1, . . . , 4, are known.
The cryptanalysis is based on the fact that the system of
equations
s1 = aX1 + b (n1X1 + 1)
d1 = bX1 − a (n1X1 + 1)
s2 = aX2 + b (n2X2 + 1)
d2 = bX2 − a (n2X2 + 1)
s3 = aX3 + bY3
d3 = bX3 − aY3,

(5)
obtained from (1) and (4), admits a unique solution “in Q”
whenever the following inequalities hold:
D1 = (s1n1 − s2n2 + d1 − d2)2 + (d1n1 − d2n2 − s1 + s2)2 6= 0,
D2 = (n1n2 + 1) (s1d2 − s2d1) + (n2 − n1) (s1s2 + d1d2) 6= 0.
In fact, as a simple computation shows, we have
a = (n1d1−n2d2+s2−s1)D2
D1
, (6)
b = (n1s1−n2s2+d1−d2)D2
D1
, (7)
X1 =
s1(s1−s2)+d1(d1−d2)+n2(s1d2−s2d1)
D2
, (8)
X2 =
s2(s1−s2)+d2(d1−d2)+n1(s1d2−s2d1)
D2
, (9)
X3 =
n1(s1d3+s3d1)−n2(s2d3−s3d2)+s3(s1−s2)+d3(d1−d2)
D2
, (10)
Y3 =
n1(s3s1+d1d3)−n2(s2s3+d2d3)+s3(d1−d2)+d3(s2−s1)
D2
. (11)
Notice that the running time for solving the system (5) is
negligible as explicit formulas are used. Once a, b, X1, X2,
X3, and Y3 are known, X4 and Y4 can be directly obtained
as follows:
X4 =
as4 + bd4
a2 + b2
, (12)
Y4 =
bs4 − ad4
a2 + b2
. (13)
As the equations Yi = niXi+1 for i = 3, 4 have not been used
in the system (5), they allow one to compute q = gcd(N3, N4),
where Ni is the numerator of the fraction niXi + 1 − Yi
for i = 3, 4, and q is a multiple of p, as follows from the
very definition of the BB equation modulo p. Furthermore,
the bitlength of Ni is less than 4(t+ 1), as Ni is the sum of
three summands each of which being, at most, a product of
two factors of bitlength ≤ 2(t + 1), and other summands of
less bitlength, as it is showed in equations (14) and (15).
N3 =(n1n2 + 1)(−s1d2 + s2d1) + (n2n3 + 1)(s2d3 − s3d2) (14)
+ n1n3(−s1d3 − s3d1)− s1d3 + s3d1
+ (n1 − n2)(s1s2 + d1d2) + (n1 − n3)(s1s3 + d1d3)
+ (n3 − n2)(s2s3 + d2d3)
N4 =(n1n2 + 1)(−s1d2 + s2d1) + (n1n4 − 1)(−s1d4 − s4d1) (15)
+ (n2n4−1)(s2d4 + s4d2) + (n1 − n2)(s1s2 + d1d2)
+ (n1 + n4)(s1s4 − d1d4) + (n2 + n4)(−s2s4 + d2d4).
Hence the value of p is derived from q directly, without using
any sophisticated factorization algorithm. Once the value of p
is known, the values of a and b are obtained by reducing
modulo p the rational values for a and b in (6) and (7).
Next, we show how to perform the cryptanalysis either when
D1 or D2 vanishes. If D1 = 0, then n1 and n2 are completely
determined, namely,
n1 =
s2 (s2 − s1) + d2 (d2 − d1)
s1d2 − s2d1 ,
n2 =
s1 (s2 − s1) + d1 (d2 − d1)
s1d2 − s2d1 .
Hence, it suffices to change one of the two plaintexts and
to keep the other.
Moreover, the expressions n2 (s2d1 − s1d2) + s1s2 + d1d2
and n1 (s2d1 − s1d2)− s1s2− d1d2 cannot vanish simultane-
ously as the vanishing of both expressions imply n1 = n2,
which contradicts the assumption. Consequently, if D2 = 0,
then either
n1 =
s1d2 − s2d1 − n2 (s1s2 − d1d2)
n2 (s2d1 − s1d2) + s1s2 + d1d2
or
n2 =
s1d2 − s2d1 − n1 (s1s2 + d1d2)
n1 (s2d1 − s1d2)− s1s2 − d1d2
and we proceed as in the first case.
The cryptanalysis to the original cryptosystem as formulated
in [2] is similar to the previous one, by using an analogous
system to (5), which provides the following expressions:
a = 12
E1
E2
,
b = 12
E1
n1(s1−d1)−n2(s2−d2) ,
X1 =
(s1+d1)E2
E1
,
X2 =
(s2+d2)E2
E1
,
X3 =
(s3+d3)E2
E1
,
Y3 =
(s3−d3)
2
n1(s1−d1)−n2(s2−d2)
E1
,
where
E1 = n1 (s1 + d1) (s2 − d2)− n2 (s1 − d1) (s2 + d2) 6= 0,
E2 = (s1 − d1)− (s2 − d2) 6= 0.
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A numerical example with artificially small values is pre-
sented below.
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Suppose the secret keys are p = 88039103041, a =
82444068284, b = 74691386336, and let us consider the
following plaintext-ciphertext pairs:
n1 = 62889964901, (s1 = 23448928782, d1 = 20575584876) ,
n2 = 46618259518, (s2 = 3834180954, d2 = 17146327109) ,
n3 = 58426687172, (s3 = 20527763839, d3 = 26549794294) ,
n4 = 34101981540, (s4 = 63745825525, d4 = 34573143446) .
Here, t = 36. The values of the expressions (6)–(13) are
a =
18747516258436659290398932073219973648213388624567314364961044
76968210889714969471714448330965363014221
,
b = −
49116023455046800036831831412408261019387618474005089177373658
76968210889714969471714448330965363014221
,
X1 = − 100438259311184512896958295880
6316558602527484445611550502004901984559
,
X2 = − 20324306402445929963309585029649
947483790379122666841732575300735297683850
,
X3 = − 4042178796281286417593480091964
157913965063187111140288762550122549613975
,
Y3 = − 39736427305481927516794719785387
947483790379122666841732575300735297683850
,
X4 = − 6636253689492581216074514587646
473741895189561333420866287650367648841925
,
Y4 = − 33238053506208383143782735065227
315827930126374222280577525100245099227950
,
p = gcd(N3, N4) = 88039103041.
By using the software package MAPLE over a Intel-Pentium
D PC, CPU 3.20 GHz, 2.00 GB RAM, under Windows XP
(SP 2), the running time to compute these values, was 0.062
seconds.
For a prime number with bitlength t = 64, say
p = 1901227095 9876747001,
a = 1871225235 8876810813,
b = 1888741918 2566409020,
and using the following four random plaintexts:
n1 = 1227087084 8434884224,
n2 = 1687726605 2631596458,
n3 = 3896750374 601963646,
n4 = 1399200033 9463305695,
the running time to compute the values of a, b, X1, X2, X3,
Y3, X4, Y4, and gcd(N3, N4) = 3p, was 0.065 seconds.
For a larger prime of 128 bits
p = 3964446899 6042275986 5633386972 192728973,
the running time to break the cryptosystem was 0.078 seconds.
For the secret primary key of 192 bits
p =1173414387 5675490285 0423315885 2300218332
0750233346 767633509,
and secondary keys
a =6766631271 3194092704 6048021365 0943954694
3733334474 30258181,
b =7684478404 6912415337 2335671884 2908013378
1976475131 09338017,
the running time to break the cryptosystem was 0.094 seconds.
In this case, we obtained gcd(N3, N4) = 11p.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
1) As shown above, it usually suffices to consider four
distinct plaintext-ciphertext pairs to recover the primary
and the secondary keys of the both proposed symmetric
cryptosystems in a computationally feasible way.
2) Although the values X , Y in nX + 1 ≡ Y (mod p)
are assumed to be quadratic residues in [2], [3], which
is justified by the authors (personal communication) in
order to avoid vulnerabilities, this property seems to play
no role in the cryptanalysis proposed.
3) The cryptanalysis proposed does not involve general
factorization algorithms, but only to compute the great-
est common divisor of several pairs of integers and
few factors much smaller than the modulus p in these
greatest common divisors. As is well known (e.g. see
[1, §2.4]), the gcd(u, v) can be computed efficiently
in polynomial time, O
(
(lg(max(u, v)))2
)
, by using the
Extended Euclidean Algorithm.
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